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Abstract
HOW IS CHINA DISTINCT? What are the implications of Chinese exceptionalism? Chinese Antitrust
Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation (“Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism”)
explores these questions in the context of antitrust law and policy making. The book, authored by Angela
Huyue Zhang, positions the relatively young Chinese antitrust regime in contrast to its more mature global
counterparts, namely, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). In this analysis, Chinese
Antitrust Exceptionalism considers how China crafts and enforces antitrust policy, as well as how its
counterparts enforce their policies against China. While it focuses on this one particular domain, the book
serves to highlight the tension between an increasingly powerful Chinese state and the Western liberal
democratic order.
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Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How
the Rise of China Challenges Global
Regulation by Angela Huyue Zhang1
DANA LEVIN2
HOW IS CHINA DISTINCT? What are the implications of Chinese exceptionalism?

Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation
(“Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism”) explores these questions in the context of
antitrust law and policy making. Te book, authored by Angela Huyue Zhang,
positions the relatively young Chinese antitrust regime in contrast to its more
mature global counterparts, namely, the European Union (EU) and the United
States (US). In this analysis, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism considers how
China crafts and enforces antitrust policy, as well as how its counterparts enforce
their policies against China. While it focuses on this one particular domain, the
book serves to highlight the tension between an increasingly powerful Chinese
state and the Western liberal democratic order.
Angela Huyue Zhang is an Associate Professor and Director of the Centre
for Chinese Law at the University of Hong Kong.3 Zhang is trained as a lawyer,
having received her LLB from Peking University in Beijing and her LLM, JD, and
Doctor of Jurisprudence from the University of Chicago. She has practiced law
in several jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, New York, Brussels, and London.

1.
2.
3.

(Oxford University Press, 2021) [Zhang, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism].
JD/MBA Candidate (2022), Osgoode Hall Law School & the Schulich School of Business.
“About Angela: Biography” (n.d.), online: <www.angelazhang.net/about-angela>
[perma.cc/E5L6-5TH3].
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Her research interests sit at the intersection of law and economics, as evidenced
by her past works.4

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND CONTENTS
Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism is about how China interacts with and challenges
Western legal and economic orthodoxy. “Chinese exceptionalism” broadly refers
to a nationalistic framework that emphasizes the unique elements of China,
Chinese political realities, and “what it…means to be Chinese.”5 It is commonly
evoked in an attempt to explain or legitimize Chinese policy making, particularly
how that policy making relates to the rest of the world.6 In Chinese Antitrust
Exceptionalism, Zhang examines how this framework functions in the context of
Chinese antitrust regulation. Te purpose of the book is to demonstrate
how Chinese exceptionalism, as shown in both the way China regulates and the way
China is regulated, poses challenges to the existing global antitrust regulatory order,
one that is dominated by the pre-existing standards and norms set by the advanced
regimes such as the United States and the European Union.7

Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism largely follows the pattern set forth in the
above description. Te frst part of the book covers how China carries out its
antitrust policy-making and enforcement. Te frst chapter in that part examines
the structure and history of Chinese antitrust law, and the second chapter
examines the highly politicized processes by which agencies and bureaucrats carry
out antitrust-related enforcement. Zhang goes to great lengths in these chapters
to demonstrate how China deviates from the Western antitrust order. Notably,
she emphasizes an enforcement process that is more beholden to bureaucratic
whims than to the rule of law. For example, antitrust regulators will commonly
use media tactics to shame enforcement targets into compliance.8 Enforcement
targets that readily admit their wrongdoing and ofer a proactive solution to
regulators are known to escape shaming and other enforcement measures. Tose
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See e.g. Angela Huyue Zhang, “Te U.S.-China Trade Negotiation: A Contract Teory
Perspective” (2020) 51 Geo J Intl L 809; John Zhuang Liu & Angela Huyue Zhang,
“Ownership and Political Control: Evidence from Charter Amendments” (2019) 60 Intl Rev
L & Econ 1; Angela Huyue Zhang, “Te Role of Media in Antitrust: Evidence from China”
(2018) 41 Fordham Intl LJ 473.
Benjamin Ho, “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism: China’s Rise, Its Goodness, and
Greatness” (2014) 39 Alternatives 164 at 164.
Ibid.
Zhang, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism, supra note 1 at 5.
Ibid at 72.
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that fght back, even when they might have legitimate grounds to do so, are
subject to increased public pressure. Antitrust proceedings rarely make it into the
judicial system, because capitulation is typically the less costly option.9
Te second part of the book turns to how Chinese frms are regulated by
antitrust regimes overseas, namely, in the European Union and the United States.10
Te frst chapter focuses on how EU antitrust regulators scrutinize acquisitions
by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Te second chapter focuses on how
US regulators scrutinize SOEs and their export practices, in the context of the
United States’s heavy reliance on trade with China. In both chapters, a common
theme is the challenge that Western regulators face when trying to assess the
level of Chinese state control over any particular frm. Te level of state control
rarely maps perfectly onto the degree of state ownership, which creates difculties
in determining how to evaluate and appropriately constrain the actions of
these enterprises.
Te third and fnal part of Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism deals with the
role that antitrust enforcement plays in what Zhang calls “the bitter Sino-US
technology war.”11 Tis single chapter examines the way in which the two
countries fex their extraterritorial power to impose economic punishments
on each other. Examples include the US’ large fnes on Chinese companies
like ZTE and Chinese interference in multinational transactions, such as the
proposed acquisition of Dutch-American frm NXP by Qualcomm, another
American company.
Together, these chapters paint a picture of geopolitical and economic tension
stemming from China’s rise to global power and its exceptional policy-making
practices. For as much as the book is about antitrust specifcally, it is equally
about how China is navigating and asserting its position in a globalized world.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF WRITING ON CHINA
Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism ofers an impressive record of the intricate
workings of Chinese bureaucracy, particularly in light of China’s famously
opaque inner workings and culture of bureaucratic self-censorship. State secrecy
is a cornerstone of Chinese government operations, owing to the infuence of

9. Ibid at 71.
10. See Angela Huyue Zhang, “Part II: How China is Regulated” in Zhang, Chinese Antitrust
Exceptionalism, supra note 1, 117.
11. Ibid at 15.
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the Communist Party of China (CCP).12 Zi Yang traces this to the rise of the
CCP in the 1930s and 1940s, claiming that “maintaining secrecy was the key
to the CCP’s success in taking over China.”13 In contemporary times, state
secrecy is codifed in the Law on the Protection of State Secrets (the “State Secrets
Law”).14 Sigrid Ursula Jernudd describes the State Secrets Law as “extremely
vague and opaque,” and claims its efect is to “[make] it a crime to be involved
in the distribution of anything considered a ‘state secret.’”15 According to the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Article 2 of the State Secrets
Law defnes a state secrets as “matters that relate to state security and national
interests, are specifed in accordance with legally defned procedures, and the
knowledge of which is restricted to a defned scope of personnel within a defned
period of time.”16 Per the same, Article 9 clarifes that this includes, “secret matters
in major policy decisions on state afairs,” as well as “secret matters in national
economic and social development,” and “other secret matters that are determined
by the department administering and managing the protection of state secrets.”17
Jones Day has categorized the State Secrets Law as part of a “common theme of
ambiguity and uncertainty in Chinese law.”18 Accordingly, Andrew Browne of
the Wall Street Journal attributes a culture of fear and self-censorship amongst
Chinese bureaucrats to the CCP’s focus on protecting state secrets. Browne
explains, “Tere are no penalties for silence, but there’s plenty to lose by talking.”19
Tis is to say, the CCP does not encourage merely strict adherence to the letter of
the law, but rather broad self-censorship out of an abundance of caution.
12. Zi Yang, “Opening Up While Closing Up: Balancing China’s State Secrecy Needs and
Military-Civil Fusion” (2021) 16 Asia Policy 45 at 46.
13. Ibid at 52-54.
14. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法)
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated 1 October
2010, efective 1 October 2010) 2010 Standing Comm Nat’l People’s Cong Gaz (China).
15. “China, State Secrets, and the Case of Xue Feng: the Implication for International Trade”
(2011) 12 Chicago J Intl L 309 at 311.
16. National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “State Secrets Protection Law of the
People’s Republic of China” (2021), online: Congressional-Executive Commission on China
<www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/law-on-the-protection-of-state-secrets-cecc-partialtranslation-and> [perma.cc/B6GH-8FZG].
17. Ibid.
18. “Insights: Traps for the Unwary in Disputes Involving China” (August 2012), online: <www.
jonesday.com/en/insights/2012/08/traps-for-the-unwary-in-disputes-involving-china>
[perma.cc/Z2SB-D4S5].
19. “China’s Central Bank Can’t Shed a Culture of Secrecy,” Wall Street Journal (1 March
2016), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-central-bank-cant-shed-a-culture-ofsecrecy-1456818894> [perma.cc/LEW8-K6WE].
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Given this culture of bureaucratic secrecy and self-censorship, Zhang
demonstrates an impressive ability to extract and record intricate and seemingly
non-public details on the inner workings of the Chinese antitrust system. In her
opening chapter, she lays out the stakes of this regime, stating that “the line
between national security and antitrust policy, once belonging to separate spheres,
has become increasingly blurred,” and she later clarifes that some policy-makers
view antitrust policy as a “tool to protect national interests.”20 While this might
suggest that Zhang would struggle to get sensitive information, her work suggests
otherwise. For example, Zhang discusses an infant formula price-fxing case in
which the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), one of the
main Chinese antitrust regulators, used an aggressive media strategy to target,
and publicly shame, only some of the frms involved in the case. To the question
of why only some of the frms were targeted, Zhang references a conversation she
had with an NDRC ofcial who revealed to her that “these diferential disclosures
had to do with the frms’ levels of cooperation rather than the severity of their
conduct.”21 Zhang continues:
[I]f a frm vigorously defended itself and did not confess to its behaviour quickly,
the NDRC would subject the frm to more negative media hype and infict a higher
penalty. [Te ofcial] said that among the infant formula producers, Biostime was
the most difcult to deal with during its investigation as the frm had aggressively
defended its [resale price maintenance] practices….Biostime’s lack of cooperation
meant that it became a scapegoat.22

Tis sort of admission lays bare the highly politicized, rule-of-law agnostic
nature of antitrust enforcement in China. Te fact that Zhang was able to get a
bureaucrat to confrm it is a testament to her access and to the exceptional level
of insight found in Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism. At its best, the book is a
remarkable exposé of the inner workings of one of the world’s most powerful and
most obfuscated bureaucracies.

III. OPPORTUNITY FOR DOMESTIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
One thing that could strengthen Zhang’s argument would be further analysis
of how the Chinese antitrust regime compares to other sites of Chinese
policy-making. While the book focuses on antitrust specifcally, Zhang has
asserted that the book is about more than just this one area. “[T]he conficts that
20. Zhang, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism, supra note 1 at 15, 21.
21. Ibid at 103.
22. Ibid.
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we observe between China and the global antitrust order ofers a lens through
which we can closely observe the systematic issues that are dividing China and
the Western liberal democracies,” Zhang says in a presentation discussing the
book.23 Accordingly, an analysis of how the antitrust regime refects other areas
of globally-relevant Chinese regulation could help establish how widespread and
systematic these issues are.
For example, there is a body of literature that argues that China’s
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), has a relatively low level of
independence.24 Meanwhile, the literature suggests that central banks elsewhere
have increasingly sought greater distance from political control.25 Tis begins
to paint a picture of how the PBC, much like China’s antitrust regime, exhibits
a degree of exceptionalism in the face of Western liberal order. Tis picture is
supported by reports of global economic concern stemming from unclear PBC
decision-making, as well as skepticism about the truthfulness of economic
data that the PBC has a role in collecting and publishing.26 Whereas central
bank independence, transparent decision making, and reliable data are seen as
important elements of a well-functioning global economy, critics accuse the PBC
of eschewing these objectives in order to serve political goals. A discussion of
the parallels between the Chinese antitrust regime and PBC policy making (or
similar) could further support Zhang’s overarching observation about the tension
between China and the West. More specifcally, it could help illuminate how the
antitrust regime follows common patterns in the broader Chinese bureaucracy,

23. Angela, “Q&A with Author Angela Huyue Zhang on Her New Book ‘Chinese Antitrust
Exceptionalism”” (1 March 2021) at 00h:01m:06s, online (video): <www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vH3tFxWIP0Q> [perma.cc/CRV2-P4JV].
24. Liansheng Zheng & Hongying Wang, “Authority and Autonomy without Independence:
Te Gradual Institutional Change of the Chinese Central Bank” (2021) 30 J Contemporary
China 349 at 350, citing Nicholas R Lardy, China’s Unfnished Economic Revolution
(Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Connie Wee-Wee Chung & Jose L Tongzon,
“A Paradigm Shift for China’s Central Banking System” (2004) 27 J Post Keynesian
Economics 87; Leong H Liew & Harry X Wu, Te Making of China’s Exchange Rate Policy
(Edward Elgar, 2007); Victor C Shih, Factions and Finance in China: Elite Confict and
Infation (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Henry Sanderson & Michael Forsythe, China’s
Superbank: Debt, Oil and Infuence—How China Development Bank is Rewriting the Rules of
Finance (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
25. Zheng & Wang, supra note 24.
26. Browne, supra note 19; Mark Magnier, “China’s Better-Tan-Expected GDP Prompts
Skepticism From Economists,” Wall Street Journal (19 October 2015), online:
<www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-better-than-expected-gdp-prompts-skepticism-fromeconomists-1445269199> [perma.cc/RMX9-498E].
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which in turn could help to demonstrate the tension between that Chinese
statecraft and its global counterparts.
Tat being said, this is not a glaring omission. Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism
is otherwise thoroughly researched and argued, and it is highly convincing.
It covers its subject matter in tremendous depth, which is a credit to Zhang’s
expertise and the decade-plus of work that went into this book. While I suggest
that Zhang could have included the sort of comparative analysis I mention above,
I must also acknowledge that without it her work still delivers on its promise.

IV. CONCLUSION
On balance, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism is an impressive and compelling
examination of how one of the world’s biggest actors is shaping the global order.
Zhang’s research is deep, and her resulting analysis makes a substantial contribution
to the literature on how one of the world’s biggest and most secretive bureaucracies
is functioning. Te book thoroughly demonstrates Chinese exceptionalism in
the context of the global antitrust system and serves this up as a representative
case of broader political-economy tensions accompanying China’s rise to power.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the intersection of law and
economics, international relations, and globalization studies.

